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In United States v. Pho,' the federal government appealed two crack-cocaine
sentences that the district court had justified on its perception of unfairness in
the ioo:1 crack-to-powder sentencing disparity. Though the fairness of the
ioo:i ratio had been a dead issue, the judge in these cases believed that his
freshly minted, post-Booker discretion allowed him to revive it, and to review
and reject the ratio for the unwarranted disparities it created. Echoing many
other district courts using their Booker discretion in this way,2 Judge Torres
determined that a 20:1 ratio was more appropriate and that he would apply
that lower ratio in subsequent cases. This yielded sizable reductions for the two
defendants, Sambath Pho and Shawn Lewis, the latter of whom was spared
almost four years despite the court's determination that the ratio's unfairness
was the "only" reason for a lower sentence in his case.3 Pho was the first
appellate case to consider this burgeoning ratio-reduction movement, and it
roundly rejected Torres's recalculations as working an unreasonable usurpation
of congressional sentencing authority.4
This Comment argues that a proper understanding of Booker's
reasonableness review validates the appellate court's rejection of these reduced-
ratio sentences in Pho, and should do so despite the fact that the sentences
issued by Judge Torres were eminently "reasonable" in any colloquial sense of
1. 433 F.3d 53 (ist Cir. 2006).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d 771 (E.D. Wis. 2005); Simon v. United
States, 361 F. Supp. 2d 35 (E.D.N.Y. 2oo5).
3. See 433 F.3 d at 64; Consolidated Opening Brief for the Appellant at 4-7, Pho, 433 F. 3d 53
(Nos. 05-2455 & 05-2461) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant].
4. See 433 F.3d at 63. The Fourth Circuit recently added its approval to the rule in Pho, echoing
its language of judicial "usurpation." United States v. Eura, Nos. o5-4437 & 05-4533, 2006
WL 44oo99 (4 th Cir. Feb. 24, 20o6).
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the term. Two possible conceptions of reasonableness review must be
distinguished- "reasonable-length" review and "reasons-based" review-and
the latter should be preferred. Reasons-based review focuses not on the terms
imposed but on the reasons given for imposing them, insisting that those
reasons comport with Congress's sentencing priorities. This paradigm, more
so than the vague reasonableness standard, acknowledges congressional
authority over sentencing rationales and preserves a central role for Congress's
much-beloved Sentencing Guidelines going forward. At the same time, by
seeing the Guidelines as providing reasons rather than outcome-oriented
formulae, it avoids the rote view of the Guidelines that rendered them
unconstitutional under Booker.' It is thus not only the most appropriate view
on the law, but also capable of reconciling Congress's obvious desire for rule-
bound sentencing with the advisory role of the Guidelines as they now stand.
I. REASONS REVIEW EXPLAINED
The core idea of the reasons-based model is that appellate sentencing
scrutiny should be focused on the reasons invoked by the sentencing judge
rather than the numerical outcome those reasons produced. Thus, an appellate
court should not uphold a sentence based on insufficient reasons even if, in
terms of length, the sentence appears to be appropriate. 6 On the other hand, if
the reasons for the sentence are correctly and completely articulated, a sentence
should be presumed reasonable, with appellate judges policing only those
adjustments that are so large vis-'-vis their justifying reasons as to make them
appear pretextual. In short, appellate courts should carefully and critically
examine the reasons district courts place on the sentencing scale, but should
show deference as to the balance actually struck.'
An example will highlight the difference between the two paradigms and
explain why we should prefer reasons review. Imagine a sentencing hearing at
which the judge states: "Mr. Smith, given your clean record, community
s. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
6. See United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2005).
7. The First Circuit's recent en banc opinion, while not distinguishing between reasons-based
and reasonableness review, presents its proposed methodology in helpful language
consistent with the reasons-based approach: "[O]ur emphasis in reviewing such claims will
be on the provision of a reasoned explanation, a plausible outcome and-where these criteria
are met- some deference to different judgments by the district judges on the scene." United
States v. Jim~nez-Beltre, No. 05-1268, slip op. at 9 (1st Cir. Mar. 9, 2006). This procedure
applies regardless of whether the sentence is within the Guideline range or not, and I take it
to prioritize a fully "reasoned" sentence over other considerations by requiring only a
"plausible outcome" on the basis of acceptable reasons.
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involvement, and contrition, I would ordinarily be inclined to sentence you to a
term of sixty months. However, because your Syrian background means there
is an outside chance you are a terrorist, I sentence you to seventy-two." This
judge has invoked a most inappropriate reason. Yet further assume that the
applicable Guideline range is sixty-six to seventy-eight months, and that the
last ten post-Booker defrauders have received a sentence within roughly that
range. There is something desperately awry with this situation despite the fact
that the defendant's sentence lies directly in the middle of both the range and
the recent sentencing pattern. The sentence itself may be reasonable, but the
reasoning is not. The problem would be just as acute if the court had picked
different criteria that were irrational rather than blatantly unconstitutional -
say, that the defendant had no middle name or preferred carrots to peas. The
lesson is clear: Reasons matter more than outcomes; a reasonable-length term
plays second fiddle to a well-reasoned sentence.
The real question is thus what makes a sentence well reasoned, and the
answer is congressional intent. All federal sentencing authority derives from
Congress, and courts thus have the responsibility of deferring to legislatively
expressed sentencing purposes. Particular sentencing decisions are thus not
acts of mystical judgment, but rather ordinary acts of judicial interpretation. In
other words, courts must use their usual set of interpretive tools to divine the
congressional will.
After Booker, two sets of materials are especially relevant to this interpretive
task. The first is 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which enumerates certain broad goals of
sentencing and directs courts to impose a sentence "sufficient, but not greater
than necessary" to make those ends meet.8 The other is the Guidelines. Though
not a statute, the Guidelines are themselves statements of valid sentencing
reasons, enacted by Congress's chosen agent, requiring a congressional stamp
of approval, and enumerated as a relevant factor in 5 3553(a)(5). The Guidelines
Manual, moreover, is not just a set of mathematical exercises, but includes
detailed commentary on why and how certain enhancements and reductions
apply-insights that, when coupled with the specific adjustments and other
available sources, disclose underlying principles for sentencing that merit
judicial consideration. 9 Guideline provisions also incorporate their authorizing
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
q. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (2004) (including commentary and
notes on drug guidelines); Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the
Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 19 (2003).
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criminal statutes, and may have layered and relevant "legislative" histories." A
proper sentence thus requires a careful weighing of the principles presented in
and associated with these two sources, with the ultimate goal of reaching a
result animated by the ends and priorities of Congress as best as courts can
know them. Reasons review is meant to ensure that these general and specific
sources of congressional reasons get their full due in the sentencing courts.
II. PHO AS REASONS-BASED REVIEW
Pho is a real-world example of the hypothetical recited above. While the
First Circuit was concerned that the reasons behind Judge Torres's ratio
reduction did not comport with Congress's sentencing priorities, it was utterly
unconcerned with whether the lengths of the sentences finally imposed were
reasonable. Moreover, Pho involved a kind of contest between the reasons
expressed in § 3553(a) and the reasons found in the Guidelines. This is because
the district courts that opted for a 20:1 ratio justified their rejection of the crack
Guidelines on 5 3553(a) itself. Ultimately, the appellate court in Pho appears to
favor the crack Guidelines as the more specific or telling communication of
congressionally validated sentencing reasons, and thus may teach us a lesson
about the proper role for the Guidelines as a source of sentencing authority
going forward.
Pho held that a judge may not prospectively reject the ioo:1 ratio in favor of
a lower ratio that he believes is more appropriate. The case framed the issue
perfectly because (1) Judge Torres had made clear that using the 2o:1 ratio was
going to be his general practice, and (2) unlike the fact-specific situations that
usually confront reviewing courts, the judge here had explained that the
unfairness of the disparity provided the "only" reason for a lower sentence."
That reason, said the First Circuit, was to be ignored.
In reaching this conclusion, the Pho panel made a crucial insight regarding
the congressional pedigree of the lOO:1 ratio. The court recognized that the
ioo:1 ratio was the kind of policy judgment to which judges must ordinarily
1o. I mean to include within consideration of the Guidelines any materials directly relevant to
their interpretation, including, but not limited to, other policy statements from the
Commission. With respect to the crack guidelines at issue in Pho, such materials abound.
See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY (2002) [hereinafter 2002 REPORT]; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY (1997); U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING
POLICY (1995).
ii. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 4.
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defer,' 2 and further noted that, unlike many Guideline provisions, the ratio was
not an invention solely, or even largely, of the Sentencing Commission.
Rather, it was "Congress [that] incorporated the loo:i ratio in the statutory
scheme, rejected the Sentencing Commission's 1995 proposal to rid the
Guidelines of it, and failed to adopt any of the Commission's subsequent
recommendations for easing the differential." 3 Recognizing that Congress has
frequently supported the ioo:i ratio over the past two decades, the court
reasoned that Judge Torres's rejection of the ratio as generally unfair
represented little more than an open "disagreement with broad-based policies
enunciated" by Congress. 14 Such open rejections, the First Circuit panel said,
are inappropriate.
Yet district court judges in the 2o:1 movement did not represent themselves
as in open "disagreement with broad-based policies" announced by Congress.
Courts participating in this Pho phenomenon have expressed more careful
reasons for their actions. While many judges have rejected the Guidelines'
loo:1 ratio in general and prospectively adopted a lower rate, 5 they have
nonetheless invoked both the Commission and the Congress as supporting
their decision. Indeed, the 20:1 rate was not conjured from mere judicial
preferences: It had been endorsed by the Sentencing Commission itself. The
Commission has repeatedly concluded that there is little justification for the
yawning divide between crack and powder sentences, and has sent several
recommendations to Congress to decrease the disparity. 6 Though its sole
attempt to formally reduce the disparity in the Guidelines was rejected," the
Commission has revisited the issue time and again, often at congressional
invitation.' 8 In short, the 20:1 ratio is not a judicial pipedream, but the
Commission's going rate. ' 9
12. United States v. Pho, 433 F. 3d 53, 62 (lst Cir. 2006) ("The decision to employ a loo:1 crack-
to-powder ratio rather than a 2o:1 ratio... is a policy judgment, pure and simple.").
13. Id. at 62-63. The Guidelines track the ratio enacted in the statutory mandatory minima. See
21 U.S.C. § 84 1(b) (2000).
14. Pho, 433 F.3d at 65. The key fact is that Congress has voted on the ratio twice: when it
enacted the statutory mandatory minima, and then when it rejected the recommended
reduction in 1995. See United States v. Tabor, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1056-58 (D. Neb. 2005),
affd, 439 F.3 d 826 (8th Cir. 2006).
15. See Pho, 433 F.3d at 64 (citing district courts' prospective choice of a 20:1 ratio).
16. For a judicial account of the Commission's recommendations, see United States v. Smith,
359 F. Supp. 2d 771, 781-82 (E.D. Wisc. 2005); and the reports cited supra note lo.
17. See Simon v. United States, 361 F. Supp. 2d 35, 45 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
18. Id.; see also supra note lo.
ig. See 2002 REPORT, supra note lo, at io6.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal 2187
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Not content to rely solely upon the unfairness of the disparity as decried by
the Commission, the district courts further sought to hook their use of the 2o:1
ratio into the congressional sentencing statute itself. Their view was that the
loo:1 Guideline ratio created an "unwarranted disparity between defendants"
in contravention of § 3553(a)(6). 2° Insisting on a fair ratio was not their idea,
they argued, but Congress's."
The First Circuit panel was unpersuaded, finding this reasoning inattentive
to the more specific expressions of congressional will in the crack Guidelines
and their legislative history. The key point was expressed by Judge Selya when
he noted that "whether apples are being compared with apples for purposes of
disparity is in the first instance up to Congress, not up to the courts. " "2 Thus,
even though district courts grounded their objections to the loo:i ratio in the
congressional language of "unwarranted disparity," they in fact ignored
Congress's prerogative to determine which forms of disparity are warranted at
sentencing. The crux of the case is therefore the separation of powers, in the
form of Congress's exclusive right to determine what ultimately counts as a
disparity, and therefore as a valid sentencing consideration."
Having thus acknowledged the special status of the loo:1 ratio as a
congressional policy determination, and the unassailable prerogative of
Congress to set sentencing policy, Pho struck down the reduced sentences -
without regard to the reasonableness of their length. If the First Circuit had
been conducting reasonable-length review, it is unlikely that it could have
struck down the sentences at all. Nearly everyone (save Congress), from the
Commission to the public opinion pollsters, agrees that crack sentences are far
too high, both in themselves and relative to powder punishments. Outcome-
oriented reasonableness review would thus command upholding the sentences
in Pho. It was only reasons-based review, with its directive that sentencers hew
tightly to Congress's chosen sentencing reasons, that demanded remand. The
2o. E.g., Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 781.
21. Though "disparity" was at the core of these crack-powder cases, other factors from § 3353(a)
might have been relevant as well. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5) (2ooo) (directing courts to
consider "any pertinent policy statement issued by the Commission"); 5 3553(a)(2)(A)
(stating that the sentence must "reflect the seriousness of the offense").
22. Audio Recording of Oral Argument, United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53 (ist Cir. 20o6) (Nos.
05-2455 & 05-2461) (on file with author).
23. See Pho, 433 F. 3d at 65 ("Our goal is simply to ... respect the separation of powers between
the legislative and judicial branches of government. While we share the district court's
concern about the fairness of maintaining the ... loo:1 crack-to-powder ratio, the proper
place to assuage that concern is in the halls of Congress, not in federal courtrooms.").
24. For poll numbers, see Simon v. United States, 361 F. Supp. 2d 35 , 46-47 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
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unanimous First Circuit panel's vote to vacate and remand in Pho should
therefore be seen as a strong endorsement of the reasons-based approach.
This reasons-based model is evident in other contexts as well. In United
States v. Cunningham, for example, Judge Posner held that an appellate court
must not uphold a post-Booker sentence if a district court fails to state its
reasons, even if the sentence is within the Guideline range and otherwise
reasonable as a matter of length.2" Reasons matter, these appellate judges are
saying, and they matter so much that a sentence that the appellate court
believes is the right length still should be vacated if the wrong reasons were
offered in support. Indeed, Posner's rule is that a sentence must be invalidated
even without a wrong reason if the right kinds of reasons are absent.
Reasons-based review may also explain the emerging presumption of
reasonableness that the circuits have been attaching to within-Guideline
sentences. Several circuits have held that within-Guideline sentences are
entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness, and even though some
circuits appear to disagree, a year of Booker review has seen courts uphold
nearly all within-Guideline sentences as reasonable.26 For the reasons-based
reviewer, this is as it should be. The Guidelines are valid statements of
sentencing reasons, and if the district court applies them and simultaneously
concludes that no other reason from § 3553(a) warrants an adjustment, there is
no valid source of reasons left on which to ground a holding that the sentence
is unreasonable. A within-Guideline sentence might seem unreasonably high to
the ordinary person, but with respect to valid sentencing reasons, only the
ordinary congressperson counts.
III. REASONS REVIEW AND THE FUTURE OF THE GUIDELINES
Just as Pho helps to distinguish between reasons-based and reasonable-
length review, it can also help us to speculate on the future role of the
Guidelines. Yet Pho's principle of policy deference to Congress cannot be
extended unproblematically from the crack-powder disparity to the Guidelines
as a whole because the loo:1 ratio has a congressional stature that little else in
the Guidelines shares. Most policy determinations in the Guidelines are in fact
25. 429 F.3d 673 (7 th Cir. 2005).
26. See Sentencing Law and Policy, http://sentencing.typepad.com (Feb. 20, 2006, 9:50 EST)
(collecting and linking various decisions from the courts of appeals on the "presumption of
reasonableness" for within-Guideline sentences). There are two exceptions, but both cases
arose in extraordinary circumstances, and in circuits that, in any event, apply a presumption
of reasonableness. See United States v. Lazenby, No. 05-2214 (8th Cir. Mar. 1o, 2006);
United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2005).
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those of the Commission, not Congress, and so it is not clear whether they
should be treated with the same respect as were the crack Guidelines in Pho. Is
crack a special case, or should we conclude that judges are never empowered to
reject a Guideline in general as unfair or inconsistent with § 3553(a)?
On this question I can offer only the following observation, which I take to
be the central principle of Pho: The problem with the district court's rejection
of the crack Guidelines was not that it was a Guideline as such, but rather that
it represented a clearly expressed congressional policy judgment. It is thus only
insofar as other Guideline provisions manifestly express Congress's sentencing
priorities that they should command the kind of strict deference given to the
crack Guidelines in Pho.
It seems quite natural to assume that, on the reasons-based view, not all
Guidelines are created equal. The extent to which a certain Guideline item
represents a congressional - and not just a Commission - policy choice varies
from provision to provision based on the extent to which the tools of judicial
interpretation evince a particular congressional view on the matter. That
proviso aside, however, we should not underestimate Congress's high
estimation of the Guidelines. Congress created the Commission and must at
least tacitly approve of all the content it produces. It is true that the link
between Congress and the Commission is attenuated27 and that Guideline
enactment is rife with process failings. Yet this only provides a reason to push
for needed procedural reforms, rather than to discredit the Guidelines in
general or to ignore the fact that Congress favors them and has played a role in
their creation not grossly incongruous with the role it plays in other forms of
agency-made law.
Meanwhile, the Guidelines should still be construed as the most
comprehensive statement of sentencing reasons that we currently have - a kind
of Restatement of Sentencing." A perusal of the Guidelines shows that they
provide well-thought-out, crime-specific enhancements and reductions, while
simultaneously creating a relative ordering of the magnitude of certain crimes
and adjustments. Though it is tempting to envision the Guidelines Manual as a
27. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (deriding the
Commission as "a sort of junior-varsity Congress").
28. In United States v. Jiminez-Beltre, Chief Judge Boudin's majority opinion for the en banc
First Circuit adopted the view that "the guidelines cannot be called just 'another factor' in
the statutory list because they are the only integration of the multiple factors." No. 05-1268,
slip op. at 7 (1st Cir. Mar. 9, 20o6) (citation omitted). This is the correct view, for the
Guidelines embody the judgment of Congress's chosen body of experts on how best to
synthesize the various statutory sentencing goals. Without this synthetic "Restatement," the
sentencing generalities of § 3553(a) would suffer from too easy a slide into limitless
platitudes. See, e.g., United States v. Dean, 414 F.3 d 725, 729 (7 th Cir. 2005).
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kind of calculus textbook with only rote, mathematical problems for judges to
work through, beneath almost every provision lies a policy judgment deserving
of some measure of judicial respect. What were once rules must now be parsed
for principles, with reasons-based review in place to oversee the interpretive
judgments of the district courts. It is the post-Booker responsibility of the
district courts to apply the Guidelines in a way that is faithfl to the principles
that animate them and to the policy goals that they explicitly endorse, and to
resolve apparent conflicts with the more general statutory goals of § 3553(a) in
the Guidelines' favor. This does not mean religious adherence to the numerical
dictates of the Guidelines in terms of points, months, and ranges, but it does
mean real engagement with the policy statements that underlie those figures.
Booker discretion in the application of § 3553(a) should invite judges to apply
the Guidelines in each case based on individualized considerations, but cannot
allow the unmaking of the Guidelines through individualized judicial
reconsideration of congressional policy judgments. Booker review should thus
maintain the Guidelines' continued viability, but in a manner consistent with
their flexibility as sentencing reasons rather than with the invisibility of
platitudes or the rigidity of numerical rules.
CONCLUSION
There are advantages to this reasons-based approach to reasonableness
review. First, as I have tried to demonstrate through Pho and with reference to
other cases, it happens to be a form of review in which the appellate courts are
already comfortably engaged. Second, and more importantly, it is faithful to
the inescapable fact that ultimate authority over the nature and purposes of
sentencing lies with Congress. Treating the Guidelines as a specific statement
of sentencing priorities might take the roles of Congress and the Commission
as reasons-givers more seriously than mechanical application of mathematical
formulae ever did. Reasons-based review contemplates judges in a deep
engagement with the substance of the Guidelines and relevant statutes in an
effort to do justice to their internal logic and meaning. It also makes clear- in a
way that congressional rulemakers are sure to appreciate -that Booker has not
set us adrift in a sentencing regime without rules.
At the same time that this approach validates the Guidelines going forward,
it also leaves room for discretion, which should give comfort to those who
appreciate the flexibility of post-Booker sentencing. Not only is reasons review
faithful to current approaches and congressional authority, but it can also
appeal to Guideline lovers and skeptics alike.
ERIC CITRON
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
